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I. INTRODUCTION'
Recent law and economics literature has paid attention to a
phenomenon, which has mainly been developed by the Supreme
Court of India, of allowing law suits in the public interest, defined as
Public Interest Litigation ("PIL").2 In a number of studies, Raja and
Xavier have shown that, as far as environmental harm is concerned,
the Supreme Court of India has played an instrumental role in
reducing the increase of pollution levels, specifically concerning the
ambient air quality in Delhi.3 There is convincing empirical evidence
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School; Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law,
Maastricht University and Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics,
Erasmus University Rotterdam.
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1. We are grateful to the participants at the Asia-Link Conference in
Hyderabad (Feb. 29, 2008), at the Metro Seminar (Maastricht, Apr. 24, 2008), and
at the 26th Annual conference of the European Association of Law & Economics in
Rome (Sept. 2009) for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. T.C.A. Anant & Jaivir Singh, An Economic Analysis of Judicial Activism,
ECON. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 26, 2002, at 4433 (India).
3. Angara V. Raja & Francis Xavier, Economic Efficiency and Public Interest
Litigations (PIL): Lessons from India (Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA
Paper No. 3870, 2007) (paper presented at the first annual conference of the Asian
Law and Economics Association, Seoul National University, Seoul, South-Korea
2005) (Germany) [hereinafter Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency]; Angara V.
Raja & Francis Xavier, Efficiency and Strategic Behaviour: The Case of Mass
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that P1L can be effective in environmental cases. Yet, PIL raises a
few interesting questions: What specific features of the legal
institutions in India make it possible for the Supreme Court to play
this positive role in awarding environmental protection? How has the
Indian judiciary been able to effectively protect the environment, but
courts in other developing countries have not? In order to answer
these important questions, which may have important implications
for the role of legal institutions in other developing countries, it is
necessary to identify the key variables that make P1L work in India.4
To identify the specific conditions and circumstances that can play
a positive role in promoting an increase of social welfare, specifically
a reduction of pollution levels, P1L must be analyzed from a broader
law and economics framework. Such an approach to the analysis of
PL is yet to be undertaken, but is necessary to indicate when PIL can
play this positive role.5 Such an analysis needs to put PL in a
broader perspective by comparing it to other environmental legal
instruments, which may reveal the circumstances under which PIL
produces comparative benefits.
The methodology we apply to answer the above questions will be
both theoretical and empirical. At a theoretical level, the strengths
and weaknesses of existing approaches to environmental problems in
developing countries like India will be briefly reviewed. When some
of the weaknesses of these traditional approaches have been
identified, one can understand why and where PIL may play a role in
Torts (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Hyderabad
Department of Economics) (India) [hereinafter Raja & Xavier, Efficiency and
Strategic Behaviour]; Angara V. Raja & Francis Xavier, Regulatory Failure and the
Economic Efficiency of Public Interest Litigation (2007) (unpublished manuscript)
[hereinafter Raja & Xavier, Regulatory Failure].
4. PIL was not invented in India, rather it has its origin in the U.S. Moreover,
there are experiences with environmental PIL in Pakistan and Bangladesh. See
JONA RAZZAQUE, PUBLIC INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN INDIA,
PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH (Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2004) (Neth.).
5. The PIL in India generally has already received a lot of attention. See, e.g.,
Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting
the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989). The possibilities of judicial
activism in the environmental area have also been widely studied. See, e.g., Ayesha
Dias, Judicial Activism in the Development and Enforcement of Environmental
Law: Some Comparative Insights from the Indian Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. L. 243
(1994) (U.K.). However, so far less attention has been given to the precise
circumstances under which environmental PIL may be effective.
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environmental policy. Indeed, at a theoretical level several important
questions arise. For example, how can the Indian Supreme Court
enforce decisions that reduce the emissions of certain pollutants upon
a large number of polluters? We will look at how the Supreme Court
of India has dealt with specific practical problems and potential
weaknesses of PTL. 6  The empirical analysis will focus on the
Supreme Court of India's experience with PIL. We will discuss
what significance the results seen in India have for other countries,
and whether it is possible, at the theoretical level, to predict the
circumstances and conditions under which PEL can be expected to
play a positive role in environmental policy enforcement in other
countries. By transposing elements of PIL in India to a more general
level, we will critically examine its effectiveness. This examination
begins by noting that pollution levels have decreased as a result of
case law of the Supreme Court of India; we continue by considering
the cost associated with this form of pollution abatement, and
whether PIL is an effective instrument if other mechanisms, such as
public enforcement or private litigation, are available. At a
theoretical level, some ideas still have to be formulated concerning
the circumstances where the comparative benefits of PIL may be
strong.
This article will draw upon the earlier work of Raja and Xavier
where PIL was analyzed from an empirical perspective. 8 The results
of that earlier work will now be reformulated by addressing the
relevance for the general environmental law and economics doctrine.
This naturally puts a few limits on the current approach:
1. We will not engage in actual modelling of the Indian
Supreme Court decisions but rely on earlier work in
that respect.
6. In order to analyze this, we will make use of the rich body of literature on
judicial activism in India, even though our article will merely focus on
environmental PIL. For more information on the much broader phenomenon of
judicial activism, see SATYA P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA (2002).
7. See Anant & Singh, supra note 2 (analyzing the efficiency of judicial
activism).
8. See Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3.
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2. We only address PL in the field of environmental
policy and not the rich case law of many other fields,
such as human rights. 9
3. The goal of this article is not to provide a final
judgement on the efficiency or legitimacy of the
decision making of the Supreme Court of India.' 0 The
latter is important since, notwithstanding the empirical
evidence of success, there has also been some critical
literature with respect to the judicial activism,
particularly from the perspective of accountability and
legitimacy. Some have blamed the Supreme Court for
engaging in "judicial legislation."" Although we will
briefly summarize these criticisms, we merely aim at
examining the phenomenon of PIL within the
traditional environmental law and economics
framework.
4. We will not conduct a comprehensive examination of
Indian environmental statutory law or environmental
jurisprudence;1 we will only briefly discuss some of
the environmental cases as illustrations of the economic
analysis, which is central to our study.
9. See SATHE, supra note 6, at 25-62 (discussing the evolution of PIL from a
historical perspective and also addressing other fields of law than environmental
problems); see also Bharat Desai, Enforcement of the Right to Environment
Protection Through Public Interest Litigation in India, 33 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 27
(1993); Siri Gloppen, Public Interest Litigation, Social Rights and Social Policy,
WORLD BANK, Dec. 12, 2005, available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resourc
es/Gloppen.rev.3.pdf (qualifying Public Interest Litigation as "social rights
litigation").
10. See generally Venkat Iyer, The Supreme Court of India, in JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS 121-68 (Brice Dickson ed., 2008)
(analyzing the judicial activism engaged in by the Supreme Court of India and its
differences with PIL).
11. Satya P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J. L.
& POL'Y 29, 84-87 (2001).
12. See Julia Mijin Cha, A Critical Examination of the Environmental
Jurisprudence of the Courts of India, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 197 (2005)
(detailing the environmental jurisprudence of India); SHYAM DIVAN & ARMIN
ROSENCRANZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY IN INDIA: CASES, MATERIALS
AND STATUTES (2nd ed. 2001) (detailing India's environmental laws) (India); see
also C.M. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE IN INDIA (1999) (Neth).
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This article is structured as follows: first, in Section II, we briefly
summarize the traditional approaches, their weaknesses and
traditional answers to environmental problems in order to explain the
role of PUL. In Section III, we briefly address and define the
phenomenon of PL and in Section IV, we address the traditional law
and economics justification for the requirement of standing (as a
major obstacle against PL). Section V analyzes the potential
strengths and weaknesses of PIL from a theoretical law and
economics perspective and, subsequently, Section VI provides a brief
overview of how Indian PL works in practice. Next, Section VII
addresses how the Indian Supreme Court has dealt with some of the
practical problems that arise from a theoretical perspective. We
provide an analysis of and formulate key conditions for the role and
place of PIL in an efficient environmental policy in Section VIII and
conclude in Section IX.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO ENvIRONMENTAL POLICY:
WEAKNESSES AND REMEDIES
A. Environment Standard Setting
The first step in setting environmental policy is to define ambient
quality standards in order to determine the ideal pollution levels in a
specific environmental component, such as air, soil or water. 13 These
are referred to as ambient quality standards in the U.S. or
environmental quality standards in Europe.14 In the public interest
model of environmental policy, the next step is to use a cost-benefit
analysis to determine how specific standards should be set so that the
desired environmental quality can be arrived at.15 The result of this
process is that subsequent emission standards or emission limit
values are established.16 An important difference between ambient
13. See MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 188-93 (Edward Elgar
2003) (discussing the optimal standard setting to control environmental pollution
using ideal pollution levels).
14. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006) (referring to air quality standards as
"ambient air quality standards") with 2008 O.J. (L 348) 105 (EU) (using
"environmental quality standards" for water policy).
15. See FAURE & SKOGH, supra note 13, at 192-93.
16. Emission limit values in Europe are defined as "the mass, expressed in
terms of certain specific parameters, concentration and/or level of an emission,
2432010]
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quality standards and emission limit values is that the ambient quality
standard is often (although this can differ based upon the legal system
concerned) an ideal standard that should be reached in order to
achieve an acceptable environmental quality level.17 Ambient quality
standards are, therefore, standards that address the regulator or
licensing authorities, not individual polluters.18 It is the task of the
licensing authorities to take these ambient quality standards into
account when setting emission limit values; an example of this is the
granting of specific emissions permits to firms.19 Hence, emission
limit values, not ambient quality standards, are enforced upon
individual polluters. 20 For example, if a firm were prosecuted for
violating the ambient quality of the air or water surrounding his
factory then to prove liability a causal link would have to be
established between the firm's pollution level and the deterioration of
the ambient quality. Hence, the difficulties of proving causation are
avoided by focusing environmental policy on emission limit values.2'
B. Private or Public Enforcement?
The next question the literature addresses is how these emission
limit values are enforced upon polluters. The first-also the
strongest, cheapest and easiest-solution is to use private law
remedies like nuisance, tort or, in rare environmental cases, contract
law. However, Shavell offers many reasons why private enforcement
of these standards may not work: the damage may be too widespread,
resulting in low damage amounts to individual victims even if the
totality of the damages is very high.22 These circumstances produce,
in the words of Schafer, a "rational apathy" on the part of the
which may not be exceeded during one or more periods of time." Council Directive
96/61, art. 2(6), 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26.
17. See Jan H. Jans & Hans B. Vedder, European Environmental Law 373-82
(3d. 2007) (Neth.) (detailing both types of standards).
18. See id. at 374-76.
19. See id. at 378.
20. See generally id. at 376-82 (describing sources that are affected by emission
limits).
21. See Marc Pallemaerts, The Proposed IPPC Directive: Re-regulation or De-
regulation, EUR. ENVTL. L. REv. 174-79 (1996) (discussing the impacts on changes
in how emission limit values are set in the European Union).
22. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 357, 372-74 (1984).
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individual victims. 23 Therefore, none of them are motivated to take
on the expense of litigation. Moreover, a private lawsuit may never
be brought due to problems with causation or latency, which is
characterized by long time laps between the emission and the actual
24
occurrence of harm. These problems are especially prevalent in
environmental cases. Additional problems include insolvency and
the identification of polluters.25 For the foregoing reasons, there is a
strong case for public enforcement of environmental standards.
C. Enforcement in Developing Countries
However, the third step in the literature illustrates, especially in so
far as developing countries are concerned, the many weaknesses in
the traditional public enforcement model. Failures can occur at the
standard-setting level, particularly through the influence of private
interest, resulting in suboptimal regulatory solutions.26 Moreover,
many failures can occur at the enforcement level.27 Sometimes these
failures are rather innocent, for example, due to the fact that
enforcement agencies lack capacity or instruments to act against
polluters; in other cases, a collusive relationship between enforcers
and environmental polluters inhibits effective enforcement of
28
environmental standards. Even in developed nations, ample
evidence of these collusive practices exists, resulting in under-
enforcement of environmental standards. 29 Where there are outright
23. Hans-Bemd Sch5fer, The Bundling of Similar Interest in Litigation. The
Incentives for Class Action and Legal Actions Taken by Associations, 3 EUR. J. L.
& ECON. 183 (2000).
24. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 509 (1986) (exploring the influence of time on court cases); see also Michael
Faure & Paul Fenn, Retroactive Liability and the Insurability of Long-tail Risks, 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 487, 497-98 (1999) (discussing the consequences on
insurability). Latency is traditionally advanced as an argument in favour of
regulation. See Shavell, supra note 22.
25. See Steven Shavell, The Judgement Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 43-58 (1986) (examining the consequences of insolvency for the
effectiveness of liability).
26. Anthony Ogus, Regulatory Arrangements and Incentives for Opportunistic
Behaviour, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN CHINA 151, 158 (Thomas Eger,
Michael Faure & Naigen Zhang eds., 2007).
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 152-53.
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corruption problems, like in many developing countries, public
enforcement will fail to be effective. o
The fourth step taken by the law and economics literature is to
address the weaknesses of standard setting mechanisms. The
traditional answer offered to overcome the particular weaknesses of
standard setting mechanisms or enforcement tools has been to
suggest the use a combination of instruments that are less vulnerable
to these problems.31
For example, Shavell argued that private enforcement through tort
rules should supplement regulation because regulations may quickly
become outdated, they cannot cover every possible situation, and
there may never be one hundred percent enforcement.32 Hence, tort
rules would serve a complementary function to back up the
weaknesses in regulation. Also, Schifer argued that, in systems
where enforcement capacity is lacking, there may be less reliance on
vague standards, which require the administrative capacity for
implementation and enforcement, and a greater use of specific
rules. 33  In addition, Ogus persuasively argued that when
enforcement is inefficient because of corruption problems, one
should move to policy instruments that are less vulnerable to
collusive practices. 34 For example, the court system is less vulnerable
to corruption than public enforcement mechanisms. 35
The law and economics literature has, for a few decades, pointed
out the shortcomings of command-and-control regulation and has,
therefore, advocated the use of market-based instruments, such as
marketable emission permits and environmental taxes.36 However,
the use of these economic instruments may not be particularly wise in
developing countries, especially if they grant a large amount of
30. See id. at 154-58; see Anthony Ogus, Corruption and Regulatory Structures
26 L. & POL'Y 329, 331 (2004).
31. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOsKY, SMART REGULATION,
DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1998) (UK) (overview of the possible
remedies and their combinations).
32. See Shavell, supra note 22.
33. Hans-Bernd Schdlfer, Rules versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries:
Precise Legal Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-income Countries,
14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 113, 114 (2006).
34. See Ogus, supra note 26.
35. See id.; see also Ogus, supra note 30.
36. See, e.g., CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1999).
[VOL. XXI
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA
discretion to administrative authorities, where administrative capacity
may be lacking, where relatively large sums of money (i.e.,
environmental taxation) is to be transferred, or where serious
corruption problems may arise. For these reasons, an optimal
environmental policy system for a developing country may be more
restrictive than otherwise advisable. 37
D. The Potential ofPublic Interest Litigation
While the earlier proposals and remedies were useful, they do not
always provide a practicable solution for India. For example, from
earlier studies it appeared that an alternative solution, private
enforcement by environmental victims where collusive practices at
the enforcement level prevented remedying the harm, was often not
possible in cases where the harm remained widespread and individual
victims lacked the incentive to file a law suit, since this would lead to
recovery of a relatively small damage award.38 This phenomenon is
known as "rational-disinterest." These studies also indicated that
class action suits, although theoretically possible, often were not
initiated in India because the transaction costs for the group to get
organized were simply too high.39
A third reason why a private legal remedy may not always work is
demonstrated by the following hypothetical example: assume there is
a polluter who is easily identifiable but whose pollution causes harm
in the vicinity of the industry. The pollution will be felt most
intensely by those who live around the factory and less intensely by
those who live progressively further away. The damages suffered by
the victims are not uniform, but the totality of the damages can be
large. The victims of the pollution have various levels of power and
incentives to litigate due to their differing income levels. Therefore,
each victim may not file a lawsuit and a class action suit may fail to
37. See Michael Faure, Marjan Peeters & Andri Wibisana, Economic
Instruments: Suited to Developing Countries?, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM THE INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 218, 247 (Michael
Faure & Nicole Niessen eds., 2006); see also Michael Faure, Environmental Rules
Versus Standards for Developing Countries; Learning from Schafer, in
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE LAW AND ITS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 735-46
(Thomas Eger ed., 2008).
38. See Raja & Xavier, Regulatory Failure, supra note 3.
39. Schifer, supra note 23.
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emerge. A potential development of this scenario is that the polluter
could try to identify the victim types who have the highest propensity
to litigate. These potential plaintiffs would be those who: (1) are
activists, (2) suffer high damages, and (3) have high income levels
(and thus have the means to file a law suit). The polluter can prevent
or avoid high litigation expenses by negotiating settlements with only
the most probable litigants. The problem created by this from the
social welfare perspective is that through these partial settlements the
probability of litigation is considerably reduced, and the externalities
of the pollution are only partially internalized.
This hypothetical example shows the potential of PL: in PIL the
litigant pool is an incredibly large set of people. The ex ante
identification of these litigants would become too costly for the
polluter. Hence, this opportunistic behaviour by the polluter is
avoided.
Before addressing whether PIL can be an effective solution for the
problems discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, we first have to
identify what PL is.
III. WHAT IS PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION?
"Public Interest Litigation" in India was initiated by a few of the
Judges of the Supreme Court, as a method to redress public
grievances.40 It was meant as a protective mechanism to redress
basic violations of the human rights of the poor and the needy.4 it
was also a way to address concerns about government conduct or
policy seen as contrary to the interests of the society.42 More
specifically, PIL was viewed as a solution to the problem of "access
to justice" in developing countries where large sections of the
population neither have the literacy nor the means to use the legal
system to redress problems arising from violations of their
fundamental rights.43 Frequently, the poor and the underprivileged
40. See Desai, supra note 9, at 28-29.
41. PIL has evolved over time. See Sathe supra note 11; see also DIVAN &
ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 133-53; SATHE, supra note 6, at 25-62, 195-248.
42. See Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3, at 7.
43. PIL, as such, is not of Indian but of American origin. We, however, focus
in this article only on PIL in India. See Clark Cunningham, Public Interest
Litigation in the Supreme Court ofIndia: A Study in Light ofAmerican Experience,
29 J. INDIAN L. INST. 494 (1987) (comparing PIL in the United States and India).
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are unwilling to assert their rights because of poverty, ignorance or
fear of social or economic reprisals from the dominant sections of
society. These disabilities could be reduced if the law allowed a
concerned citizen to sue in a court of law.45 The classical theory
requirement of locus standi precludes such a "representation," 46 and
thereby keeps the grievances of the poor from reaching the courts.
The report to the Indian Ministry of Law, Justice and Company
Affairs by Justice Bhagawati and Justice Krishna lyer 47 expressly
recommended lowering the locus standi requirement as a means of
allowing concerned citizens to file cases on behalf of the
underprivileged. 48 As a result, the definition of "persons aggrieved"
was broadened. The second modification to the standings doctrine
was to allow a concerned citizen (or a voluntary organization) to sue,
not as representative of others, but in his or her own right as a
member of the citizenry to whom a public duty is owed, referred to as
"citizen standing." 49 The need for this standing was as a check on the
abuse of executive authority in a modern welfare state.50 In India,
since the government's regulatory competences give it enormous
power, the misuse of power and authority is bound to happen.5 ' At
times, government policy or inaction may threaten the environment.
In such cases, application of the traditional standing doctrine could
preclude citizens from seeking protection. 52  Thus, the Supreme
Court of India has expanded standing to enable citizens to challenge
government actions in the public interest, even though the citizen
himself suffered little or no harm. 53
44. See Gloppen, supra note 9, at 8-9.
45. See Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3, at 9.
46. Id. In many such cases, the affected may not even know the identity of the
concerned citizen.
47. REPORT ON NATIONAL JURIDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE-SOCIAL JUSTICE 61
(1977).
48. "On behalf' does not mean that it was in consultation with or with the
consent of the affected people. Any concerned citizen who felt that an injustice
was being perpetuated on large sections of society could move the courts.
49. DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 136-37.
50. Id. at 137.
5 1. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 215-20.
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IV. THE STANDING REQUIREMENT: EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS
A. Why Locus Standi?
Traditional economic analysis defended the legal standing
requirement, arguing that parties could only sue when they had an
interest at stake and, except in the case of class action suits, for
damages they personally suffered. 54 Locus standi is an admissibility
condition that acts as a gatekeeper for the filing of cases.5 ' The
procedure determines who may submit a complaint under one of the
legal instruments.56 Traditionally, if a complainant does not have
standing under the instrument, the complaint will be rejected by the
judicial body on procedural grounds, without consideration of the
merits.57 A central issue of the standing doctrine is the nature of the
injury alleged, that is, which substantive rights were violated.
Whenever substantive rights are not aligned with the procedural
rights, the locus standi requirement becomes an obstacle. 5
The traditional economic argument against expanding standing
contends that it would lead to many, inefficient procedures, resulting
in an inefficient use of the court system and potentially to over-
deterrence. Thus, in the case of private law, a strict locus standi
makes sense.
B. Locus Standi in Public Law
However, the arguments for broadening the scope of locus standi
are different depending upon the nature of the complaints and the
incentive structure that these provisions create. Increasingly,
standing issues have attracted attention in public law actions, such as
judicial review cases, and common law public nuisance actions.60
54. Id. at 137.
55. ANNE VAN AAKEN, MAKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
MORE EFFECTIVE: A RATIONAL-CHOICE APPROACH TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IUS
STANDI PROVISIONS 4 (Max Plank Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Preprint
No. 2005-16, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=802424.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 5.
60. L.A. Stein, The Theoretical Bases of Locus Standi, in LOCUS STANDI (L.A.
Stein ed. 1979).
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For example, in the case of gross human rights violations, it has
been observed that in countries which lack strong rights protections,
their citizens are left with little means to redress their problems
before an international body.6 1 Since only those who are directly
affected can file a case and these individuals often lack the means or
incentive to litigate, the violations are not remedied. In the context of
public law, it falls to the courts to undertake judicial review of all
governmental actions. Therefore, it would not be appropriate for a
court to refuse to determine such issues because the applicant would
not benefit from the outcome. 62
C. When Can Locus Standi Produce Adverse Effects?
There are three distinct approaches to understanding why the
standing requirement may not work in the interests of justice.
The first approach follows from a rational-choice perspective: apart
from the problem of "rational disinterest," discussed earlier, the
verdict in a case with a large number of stakeholders takes on the
nature of a "public good," which would not be provided for, or is, at
best, undersupplied by a rational victim.63 Here, locus standi then
becomes an impediment to the redress process.64 We submit that the
outcome of a case, where the affected population has no judicial
access, results in a similar "failure."
The second approach to the problem of locus standi, from a justice
standpoint, stems from the concept of judicial review itself. Since,
judicial review, broadly defined, is the power of a court to review the
actions of public sector bodies in terms of their legality or
constitutionality, it becomes imperative to have a mechanism that
accomplishes this.6 5 PIL can be seen as one way of bringing the
61. See VAN AAKEN, supra note 55.
62. Mariam Hamidu, The Open-door Approach to Locus Standi by the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Respect of its Non-State
Complaints Procedure: In Need of Reform? (2006) (unpublished LLM dissertation,
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane) available at
https://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/1213/1/hamidu_m_1.pdf.
63. VAN AAKEN, supra note 55, at 50.
64. Id.
65. See ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER STATES
AND THE UNITED STATES, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Ren6 J.G.H. Seerden ed., 2d
ed. 2007); PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
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courts the claims of unlawful exercise of power or violation of rights
by a government entity. Equally important is the harm caused by the
failure of the government machinery to be a check on unlawful
activities, resulting in hardship for the citizens whose fundamental
rights need to be protected by the courts.
The third approach to the above issue can be stated as an answer to
the following question: Should the failure of the executive to enact
and enforce laws in the public interest be redressed through the
judiciary? In the words of Justice Krishna Iyer:
The categorical imperative for stability in democracy is,
therefore, to see that every instrumentality is functionally
kept on course and any deviance or misconduct, abuse or
aberration, corruption or delinquency is duly monitored and
disciplinary measures taken promptly to make unprofitable
for the delinquents to depart from the code of conduct and
to make it possible for people, social activists, professional
leaderships and other duly appointed agencies to enforce
punitive therapeutics when robed culprits violate moral-
legal norms.66
The term "judicial activism" has been given to the more active role
that the judiciary plays in ensuring that the State "does its job."
However, this could be viewed as a third approach to the problem of
locus standi, albeit an oblique one: democracy itself is the ultimate
means to make governments accountable, but in countries where
participatory democracy is still in its infancy, and given that its civil
society is not yet strong, using the judiciary and the powers that it
wields through judicial review may prove to be a cost minimizing
solution. Thus, PIL and relaxing locus standi become important
ingredients in this process.
UNITED STATES, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Ren6 J.G.H. Seerden, Michiel A.
Heldeweg & Kurt R. Deketelaere eds. 2002).
66. V.R. KRISHNA IYER, JUSTICE AT CROSSROADS 265 (1994).
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D. Potential Dangers ofRelaxing Locus Standi
However, giving "public spirited" citizens the right to move courts
can have other negative effects.67 First, it is not yet clear that there
would be a substantial number of citizens who would choose to move
the courts on the behalf of an affected community. That is, a rational
choice theory does not explain why a citizen would do so. The same
arguments that apply to the undersupply of public goods, apply here
as well. If, however, there is a private gain to the person or persons
who initiate PIL, it becomes imperative to know what these gains are.
The danger remains that PL may be used to serve private interests.
In such a case, the judge has to decide whether to admit the case or
not. If a large number of cases were to be filed, this would prove to
be an extra cost to the judiciary. 68 These costs must be weighed
against the litigation's potential benefits, both the ex post as well as
ex ante deterrence that it can create. The next section deals
exclusively with PEL, analyzing its costs and benefits from a law and
economics perspective.
V. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: A LAW AND ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE
This section will look more closely at the precise workings of PIL,
as defined in Section III, by asking a few questions using traditional
law and economics methodology. This section addresses how PIL
will or should theoretically deal with issues, such as information
advantages, administrative costs and, more particularly, what the
comparative benefits of PIL are. We also discuss some of the
potential problems from an economic perspective. Without
examining in exhaustive detail, we will introduce how some of the
issues we identify as key variables from an economic perspective are
dealt with in Indian PIL. Then, in Section VI, we address the way
PL functions in India. We deal with the way the Indian Supreme
Court handles these questions and problems in more detail in Section
VII.
67. Cha, supra note 12, at 209 (holding that this expanded doctrine of locus
standi may end up harming, not helping, the judicial process).
68. Id. at 210 ("[L]iberalization of standing can result in a flood of litigation
(delaying trials), may lead to an abuse of the liberal standing for personal gains and
to a loss of legitimacy by the courts.").
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A. Plaintiffs
The key feature of PIL is that, as a result of an expanded standing
definition, a plaintiff need not demonstrate a personal interest in the
litigation. Interest is defined broadly; thus, anyone claiming to have
an interest in a particular issue can, in principle, act as the plaintiff,
vastly increasing the number of potential litigants. Theoretically, the
positive impact is that this larger plaintiff pool can enforce the
regulation, remedying the type of regulatory failure (i.e., under-
enforcement) described above. However, the increased pool of
plaintiffs does not explain what particular incentives the litigant(s), 69
who initiate the PL, have to outweigh the costs they incur. In India,
this is not as large an issue as elsewhere since in India the procedures
for initiating a lawsuit through PIL have been simple, flexible and
70inexpensive.
One of the leading cases in this respect is S.P. Gupta v. Union of
India, in which Justice Bhagwati relaxed the rules of locus standi and
allowed standing for public-spirited citizens, both for those wishing
to expose the cause of the poor and oppressed (i.e., representative
standing) and for those wishing to enforce performance of public
duties (i.e., citizen standing).71 Because plaintiffs are able to initiate
a case by merely sending a letter, the costs of initiating a procedure
can be relatively low, which could increase deterrence of
environmental violations.72 Some report that there may even be too
many cases. According to Krishnan in March 2007, there were
40,000 cases pending before the Supreme Court of India.73 This
raises concerns of judicial economy and whether mechanisms should
be built in to deter plaintiffs from bringing frivolous suits. 74
69. It could also be a group of "concerned citizens" or even NGOs that move
the courts.
70. See Sathe, supra note 11, at 74.
71. See Lavanya Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India:
Exploring Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness and Sustainability,
19(3) J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2007).
72. See Sathe, supra note 11, at 74-75.
73. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Scholarly Discourse, Public Perceptions, and the
Cementing of Norms: The Case of the Indian Supreme Court and a Plea for
Research, 9(2) J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1003811.
74. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 389-470 (2004) (providing a summary of the general economic literature).
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Nonetheless, while the high increase in the number of potential
litigants may cause the administrative costs of litigation to escalate
because plaintiffs now have little barrier to litigate, the greatly
inflated litigant pool can also have a positive environmental effect,
since these potential litigants act as a strong deterrent to potential
polluters.
B. Defendants
Many public interest suits are brought against the government or
public authorities, with the object of compelling the authorities to
take specific action. 75 In most cases, the litigant seeks to induce the
authority to undertake measures, forcing polluters to reduce their
emissions of specific pollutants or even to relocate to other areas. In
such cases, the question arises whether litigation takes place only
against the government or is it raised against the polluting industries,
as well. In the first case, the outcome can affect the businesses
participating in the regulated industries that do not have the
opportunity to argue before the court; this may contribute to the
quality of the decision-making. In the second case, the administrative
costs of the procedure could increase significantly. Sathe argues that
in PL, there is no longer a traditional adversarial procedure, but
rather the defendant (usually a public authority) is required to
cooperate with the court in a collaborative effort towards truth
finding.76
Can the court have enough information to set environmental
standards when the interests of the regulated industries are not
represented?77 From a legal perspective, this raises questions
concerning the legitimacy of the decision-making. From an
economic perspective, the question arises whether the court will be
sufficiently informed without the involvement of the affected
industry, especially when the decision would effectively lead to
setting a new environmental standard.
75. See Raja & Xavier, Regulatory Failure, supra note 3.
76. See Sathe, supra note 11, at 77-78.
77. See Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4438.
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C. The Court
From a theoretical perspective, many questions arise as to the role
of the courts in PIL. With specific regards to the issue of the role of
the courts and whether the polluting industry is to be involved in the
PL, in India, specifically in the New Delhi air pollution case, the
industry was the second defendant in the case. Therefore, the
potential problem of not involving the industry did not arise.
1. Informational Advantage
While an initial question is what the court's role is in shaping
environmental policy, given the existing instruments, a distinction
should be made between the situations where the court merely
enforces existing regulation on the one hand and where the court
clearly goes further on the other. The latter occurs when either the
legislation is silent or when, as a result of judicial review, the court
sets aside lenient regulation. A useful distinction is made by Anant
and Singh, who argue that various forms of judicial activism exist.78
These distinctions are helpful in examining what role courts engaged
in PIL should have in promoting social welfare and where their
involvement becomes problematic. 79 They distinguish:
* Interpretational judicial activism: in this case, courts
only interpret legal documents, such as the
constitution or statutes. For example, the
interpretation of procedural law which is used to
uphold human rights could qualify as
interpretational judicial activism.
* Legislative judicial activism: in this case, the court
takes on the function of legislator and creates a
statute. An example of this form of judicial
activism can be seen in a case adjudicated by
Supreme Court of India, where it issued a rule to
78. Id. at 4437.
79. Id.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
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prevent sexual harassment in the workplace since
there were no specific laws on point.82
* Executive judicial activism: in these cases the court
executes statutes, essentially replacing the executive
branch of government. The vehicular pollution case
in Delhi, which we will discuss in detail below,83 is
considered an example of executive judicial
activism.84
The role of the court and its need for information on the optimal
environmental solution will be different when the court merely
interprets the constitution or a statute than when it replaces the
executive or legislator.
The crucial question from a law and economics perspective is what
the comparative advantage of the court is as far as information on
environmental standards is concerned. Traditional law and
economics literature states that setting emission standards involves a
complicated process of weighing the costs and benefits of various
measures and this is usually considered a process better undertaken
by specialized environmental agencies than by courts that lack a
technical background in environmental matters.85  However, the
regulator may not set the environmental standard in the public
interest, and in the specific case of India, there is much empirical
evidence of regulators watering down of technical environmental
standards as a result of effective lobbying by private interest.86 The
question then arises in PL whether there are solutions available at
lower information costs to the court, by seeking expert involvement.
Otherwise, courts set standards inefficiently, which could lead to
higher costs. As far as courts are merely enforcing existing
regulation, the danger of uninformed decision-making is less
apparent. However, if regulation is inefficient as a result of the
influence of private interest, the courts may not be able to engage in
environmental judicial activism, when it could not go further than
merely confirming the regulatory standard. Some literature reports of
82. See lyer, supra note 10, at 145.
83. See infra Sections VIL.B., and VII.C.1.
84. Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4437.
85. See Shavell, supra note 22.
86. Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3.
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Supreme Court cases where the Court demanded that limestone
quarries be closed down "as they were hazardous to the
environment."8 7 In those cases, the question naturally arises on what
basis the court comes to such decision-making.
The question that follows, then, is why the Indian Supreme Court is
better equipped and better informed to set environmental standards in
the public interest than administrative agencies.8 8 A partial answer is
that administrative agencies are apparently subject to capture. This,
however, fails to explain how the Supreme Court solves its traditional
information deficiency since judges have no specific environmental
knowledge that makes them experts who are able to set efficient
environmental standards. 89
2. Legitimacy
From a legal perspective, an equally economically relevant
question arises as to the legitimacy of the decision-making of the
court, especially when the decision reaches much further than what
the parties' facts necessarily involved. 90 Critics of judicial activism
have argued that it violates constitutional principles, even going so
far as to characterize the practice as "ad hoc-ism and cheap
populism." 91
3. Independence
A related question is why the courts, and not the legislation or
administrative agencies, set environmental standards in the public
interest.92 The traditional answer, from a legal perspective, is that the
independence of the court guarantees that it will act in the public
87. Id. at 8 n.14; see also Desai, supra note 9, at 33; Cha, supra note 12, at 203.
88. See Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4438 (arguing that "judicial modes of
processing information are not equipped to make technical choices or sample the
distribution of preferences in a society").
89. Also, Anant and Singh are critical of using executive or legislative failures
as justification for judicial activism by the courts since it breaches the separation of
powers and could raise social costs. See id. at 443 8-39.
90. See Sathe, supra note 11. The PIL is especially criticized from the
perspective of the separation of powers doctrine. See IYER, supra note 10, at 144-
50; Cassels, supra note 5, at 509-15.
91. IYER, supra note 10, at 122.
92. Ogus, supra note 30.
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interest. 93 Traditional law and economics literature has analyzed the
circumstances in which the courts can be expected to act
independently. 94 It is worth further examination to determine why
the Indian Supreme Court has been able to act in the public interest,
whereas other developing country Supreme Courts, such as the
Indonesian Supreme Court, have been shown to be captured by the
existing political elite. 95 Some legal theorists have argued that since
achieving independence in 1947, the Indian Supreme Court has
avoided capture and maintained judicial independence, always acting
in the public interest. 96 Although it is not within the scope of this
article to analyze why the Supreme Court of India and not other,
similar courts have been found to act in the public interest, the
institutional conditions that make this possible are worth further
examination from a law and economics perspective since they
constitute the basis for the success of PIL. 97
4. Court versus Executive
Following the definitional framework provided by Anant and
Singh, most of the environmental PL cases can be considered
examples of executive judicial activism.98 To the extent that the
court, in decisions concerning PIL, effectively takes the place of
either politicians or bureaucrats, the question also arises why these
individuals accept this behaviour by the court. Legal reports indicate
that there have been many attempts, most notably by Indira Gandhi,
93. See Mark Ramsayer, The Puzzling (7n)dependence of Courts: A
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994).
94. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Ramsayer, supra note
93; Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation ofPowers,
or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349
(1993).
95. See SEBASTIAAN POMPE, THE INDONESIAN SUPREME COURT: A STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONAL COLLAPSE (2005).
96. See Krishnan, supra note 73.
97. See John Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving
Judicial Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341, 341-
51 (1998) (offering a comparative perspective on judicial independence, comparing
the U.S. and some Asian courts).
98. Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4437.
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to overturn the Supreme Court's PIL decisions. 99 Some politicians,
including the current Prime Minister, appear to chastising the
Supreme Court against what has been perceived as "judicial
overreaching."' 00 In contrast, others argue that political players have
never seriously challenged the power of the Supreme Court of
India. 0 1 One explanation for this phenomenon may be that the
politicians simply do not mind the situation whereby the judiciary de
facto acts as a regulator or at least as an executive.102 Moreover, in
some environmental PIL cases, one can argue that the court is merely
executing prior Parliamentary orders or decisions to provide
environmental protection, where the executive had failed to fulfill
this duty.
In a situation, like India, where regulator capture is a significant
risk, environmentally active politicians seeking re-election and in
need of special interest support, may appreciate that the Supreme
Court sets environmental standards that the politicians could not
achieve. Under these circumstances, the actions taken by the
Supreme Court, whose Judges serve life appointments, could be seen
as an effective remedy against regulatory capture by special interest
groups. The fact that politicians accept and abide by the judicial
decisions, notwithstanding their spoken objections, may support the
hypothesis that Supreme Court activism even serves the interests of
some politicians. 103
99. See Krishnan, supra note 73, at 267. For instance, Indira Gandhi declared a
state of emergency when the Court found her guilty of corrupt electoral practices in
the general election. See Iyer, supra note 10, at 122.
100. See Krishnan, supra note 73, at 288.
101. ToM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN INDIAN CASES 98 (2003) ("India's experience
demonstrates the ability of a court to challenge political authorities, even in
difficult political circumstances.").
102. Shubhankar Dam, Green Laws for Better Health: The Past that Was and the
Future that May Be - Reflections from the Indian Experience, 16 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 593, 595 (2003-2004) ("Not only has the judiciary assumed the role
of a law-maker, but also policy maker and, at times, that of an implementing
agency.").
103. Another interesting hypothesis that is being explored is that court
interventions have the effect of making information of neglect or non-enforcement
by government agencies public. Invariably, Supreme Court interventions are given
wide publicity in the media and the press. Governments cannot afford to ignore
this and should take action to quell public outrage. See Angara V. Raja & Xavier
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D. What the Supreme Court Orders and Against Whom
Under the framework of Anant and Singh,104 it can be argued that
where the court is not merely engaging in statutory interpretation its
orders have a legislative or executive effect. Indeed, it seems that in
PL, orders often direct the government to take regulatory
measures. 0 5 In some cases, the courts specifically indicate how the
executive branch should act, in effect acting in the regulator's
place. 106 This role of the Supreme Court has been called "judicial
legislation."10 7 It is legislative to the extent that the court acts in the
legislator place. In other cases, direct orders, specified by the court,
are provided to the executive to take specific measures.los As
previously discussed, similar questions arise as to the efficiency of
this judicial environmental standard setting.109
E. How to Enforce an Order
Concerning enforcement of judicial orders, two closely related,
important issues emerge: first, who is the defendant and, second, how
is a court order enforced. 110 A review of Indian case law illustrates
that there have been some cases brought against public authorities.'
Other cases, however, are brought against polluters who did not
comply with earlier orders.112 In cases where the Court has issued
orders, it has been known to send notice of the order directly to
various industries.1 3 The question here is how to effectuate efficient
Francis, Courts, Media and Civil Society in Regulating the Regulator: Lessons from
Delhi Air Pollution Case (2009).
104. Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4437.
105. See, e.g., id.
106. See, e.g., Dias, supra note 5, at 245-46.
107. See Sathe, supra note 11.
108. See, e.g., Dias, supra note 5, at 245-46.
109. In fact, in environmental PIL, the courts can intervene in a variety of ways,
whereby in some cases they merely monitor implementation of existing policies or
clarify ambiguities in a specific legislation, whereas in others they fill normative
gaps in existing legislation. For an overview of the ways in which courts can
intervene in environmental cases through PIL, see id. at 249.
110. See Desai, supra note 9, at 36-39.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Mehta v. Union of India, 16 INT'L LAB. L. REP. 179, 190-91 (1997)
(describing an instance where the Court sent individual notices to 8,378 industries).
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compliance with the order. Various mechanisms have been described
in the law and economics literature to enforce the effective execution
of a court order. One possibility is to hold a perpetrator of a court
order in contempt, 114 but the costs of this practice have the potential
to be very high, at least when the order has to be executed. Other
possibilities include the use of a penalty payment, that is, a payment
owed by the perpetrator for every time period (e.g., a day, week, or
month) he remains in violation of the court order.115
On the issue of enforcing compliance with court orders, a
distinction should be made between orders addressed to the
government and orders addressed to polluters. An order addressed to
the government leads to regulatory action, which subsequently affects
polluters. Here, enforcement costs may be lower since the order only
has to be addressed to the specific executive administrative agency or
branch. Whether such orders will lead to great compliance by
polluters is less certain because now the executive agency will set
new regulations.
In contrast, an order directly addressed to the polluters may lead to
greater compliance. This is especially true if all violating polluters
could be held in contempt, but in these cases enforcement costs
would be substantially higher.
VI. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA
A. Potential Remedies in Environmental Cases
As a starting point, it should be noted that the development of
environmental PL in India should be set against the background of
the country's dramatic increase in environmental degradation. It was
recently reported that poor environmental quality in India is directly
responsible for twenty-five percent of all preventable illnesses,
including acute respiratory diseases. 1 16 Other studies show a close
relationship between genetic disruptions and exposure to vehicular
pollution in India." 7
114. See Desai, supra note 9, at 37.
115. See id. at 38.
116. For these and other alarming facts, see Dam, supra note 102, at 594.
117. Id.
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In India, a citizen has three civil remedies to choose from to obtain
redress for environmental damages: (1) a common law tort action
against the polluter; (2) a writ petition to compel an agency to enforce
the law and to recover damages from the violator; or (3) an
application for compensation under the National Environmental
Tribunal Act of 1995 or the Public Liability Insurance Act of 1991."9
Civil damage awards and incentives for private litigation may be
limited by sub-optimal damage compensations, the lengthy
adjudication of cases, and chronic inflation.120 Therefore, when the
pollution source and the victims are well identified,' 21 plaintiffs with
standing seem to prefer seeking injunctions over civil damages.122
Public nuisance law provides a helpful analogy to understanding
the P1L model that has evolved. 123 Since a public nuisance interferes
with a public right, it is not tied to the violation of private property
rights.124 Furthermore, every affected citizen can make use of this
remedy.125 On using the remedy of public nuisance, Krishna Iyer
observed, "[a]t issue is the coming of age of that branch of Public
Law bearing on community actions and the court's power to force
118. See generally Michael R. Anderson, Individual Rights to Environmental
Protection in India, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 199 (A. Boyle & M. Anderson eds. 1996) (discussing the instruments
to compensate victims of environmental damage in India); Michael R. Anderson,
Public Interest Perspectives on the Bhopal Case: Tort, Crime or Violation of
Human Rights?, in PUBLIC INTEREST PERSPECTIVES IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154-
71 (David Robinson & John Dunkley eds. 1995); DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra
note 12, at 91-132; Michael R. Anderson & Anees Ahmed, Assessing
Environmental Damage Under Indian Law, 5 R. EURO. COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 335-41 (1996).
119. See ABRAHAM, supra note 12, at 37-60 (discussing the possibility of using
the doctrine of public nuisance in Indian environmental jurisprudence).
120. See DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 88-89 ("Damages awarded in
tort actions in India are notoriously low, and pose no deterrent to the polluter.
Lengthy delays in the adjudication of cases combined with chronic inflation dilute
the value of any damages that a successful plaintiff may receive.").
121. See id. at 134-41.
122. See id. at 89.
123. See id. at 91-92.
124. See id.
125. Id.
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public bodies under public duties to implement specific plans in
response to public grievances."l 26
B. The Writ Jurisdiction
Under Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution, the specific
writs of jurisdiction that empower the Supreme Court of India to
issue direction orders are the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.127 Writs of mandamus
have been successfully used to command action by a public authority
when it was found that the authority failed to carry out its duties.128
PL is an extension of the writ jurisdiction; the difference being
twofold: (1) that the court may initiate action in the public interest if
the concerned judge becomes aware of any violations; and (2) the
locus standi is relaxed so that any public-minded citizen can move
the court. 129
C. Characteristics ofPublic Interest Litigation
The following are some of the salient characteristics of the PIL
process in India:130
(a) "Public Interest Litigation has recently adopted the
notion of a continuous mandamus. This involves
securing compliance trough periodic 'interim'
directions. Here the court does not formally admit the
126. Ratlam v. Vardhichand, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1622, reprinted in DIVAN &
ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 114-19.
127. For a detailed discussion, see IYER, supra note 10, at 123-25; see also
DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 123-27; RAZZAQUE, supra note 4, at 186-
90.
128. See, e.g., Rampal v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1981 R.A.J. 121, reprinted in
DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 124-26. Residents of a town filed a
petition showing that the Municipal authorities failed to discharge their duties in
the removal of stagnant waters and garbage. The court directed that the Municipal
authorities not only remove the cause of the public nuisance in the locality but also
construct the proper sewers and drains for the discharge of such water. Id.
129. See Ayesha Dias, Environmental Law, Policy and Practice in India, 2
ENVTL. LIABILITY 86, 88-89 (1994); see also Desai, supra note 9, at 29-3 1.
130. In this article, we mainly focus on the application of PIL in environmental
cases, but its scope is much broader than simply environmental law. For an
overview, see Iyer, supra note 10, at 143.
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petition, but prods the recalcitrant agency to perform its
duty within a time frame. The case is posted every few
months to monitor the agency's performance and for
further interim directives."l31
(b) Parties and official agencies may be joined, and even
substituted, as the litigation unfolds;1 32 thus, new and
unexpected issues may emerge that modify the case.
(c) The expanded status includes at least two different
kinds of standing recognized by the Supreme Court: (1)
"Representative Standing" or to represent the poor and
underprivileged; or (2) "Citizen Standing" in cases of
Executive inaction or abuse. 133
(d) PTL may be dismissed if it is found to be motivated by
private interest. 134  Here, the court usually imposes
costs on the litigant. In the case of Subhash Kumar v.
State ofBihar, the Court explicitly noted that:
Personal interest cannot be enforced through the
process of this court under Art.32 of the Constitution
in the garb of Public Interest Litigation. It is the duty
of this court to discourage such petition and to ensure
that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted
by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this court for personal
matters under the garb of the Public Interest
Litigation. 135
(e) The Court has the inherent power to appoint
independent commissions to verify case facts. 136 When
131. See DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 132.
132. lyer, supra note 10, at 141-42.
133. Early environmental cases decided by the Supreme Court of India, that
stand as examples of citizen standing cases, resulted in the closure of Lime Stone
quarries in the Dehera Dun region, the installation of safeguards at a Chlorine Plant
in Delhi, and the closure of Polluting Tanneries on the Ganga River. See DIVAN &
ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12.
134. Id. at 141.
135. Id. (quoting the Supreme Court of India in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar,
A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 420).
136. Id. at 148.
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there are environmental problems, the courts frequently
call upon the National Environment Engineering
Research Institute ("NEERI") to submit the reports.137
(f) The judicial "notice of facts" reduces the litigant's
evidentiary burden. In the Ganga River pollution case,
the Court did not wait for scientific proof on what the
health effects on the exposed population would be or
what property damage could result.' 38 In the view of
certain jurists and academics, the Court assumed that
such injuries had either occurred or would likely occur
and then proceeded to issue remedial directions. 139
(g) In a few recent PIL cases, the courts made reference to
the "precautionary principle" to argue that there should
be a "reversal of the burden of proof."1 40  The
consequence of such a reversal is that the onus of proof
is on the developer or the industry to show that its
action is environmentally benign.
D. Perceived Weaknesses
There are also a few perceived weaknesses of the PIL in India.141
The first, and most fundamental, issue raised by PIL is that the courts
frequently overstep their jurisdiction and involve themselves in
matters belonging to the executive and the legislature. This is often
done in the name of upholding fundamental rights and protecting
individual liberties. This, however, has not been overlooked by
courts. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union ofIndia, 142 Justice Pathak
observed:
In the process of correcting executive error or removing
legislative omission the court can so easily find itself
137. Id.
138. Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1115 (India).
139. Id.
140. Dam, supra note 102, at 608, 612.
141. Here, we merely provide an overview of some of the potential weaknesses
of PIL, as identified in the literature generally. Specific problems with PIL relating
to environmental pollution cases will be further discussed in Section VII infra.
142. Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802. See also DIVAN &
ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 150-51.
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involved in policy making of a quality and a degree
characteristic of political authority, and indeed run the risk
of being mistaken for one. An excessively political role
identifiable with political governance betrays the court into
functions alien to its fundamental character and tends to
destroy the delicate balance envisaged in our constitutional
system between its three basic institutions. It is a serious
question whether in every case the same awesome respect
and reverence will endure during different stages of
affirmative action seeking to regulate the lives of large
numbers of people, some of whom never participated in the
judicial process.143
As for the second issue, there is very little theory that would
explain why a public-minded citizen would move the courts into
action. Certainly, this is an important question from a law and
economics perspective. If rational choice theory is to be
believed, then we must conclude that every public interest case
also generates some private gains, separate and distinct from the
interests in the case itself. In some cases, the primary mover of
the litigation gains such favor with the courts that he is later
considered an expert on such matters and may be sought out to
help the courts in future cases. This, in and of itself, may not be
a negative development but it has the potential to lead to
problems. A much discussed case is that of M.C. Mehta, whose
fame as the instigator of the PIL in the Delhi air pollution case
and its subsequent success has led him to petition for
"Environmental Studies" inclusion in the list of compulsory
subjects taught in the curricula of all Indian undergraduate
schools and colleges. The Supreme Court of India, rather than
forwarding the petition to the Ministry of Education, proceeded
to direct the University Grants Commission to implement the
suggestion without any further delay.144 At best, the propriety
of the Court's action in this instance is questionable.
There is a further issue in India that the PIL cases that are
filed and given consideration are only done because they can
143. Id.
144. See Mehta v. Union of India A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 382 (1992); see also, DIVAN
& ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 151-52.
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attract significant media attention, rather than because they
concern issues of fundamental importance, but lacking in drama.
In one such case, PIL was filed against a beauty pageant held in
Kerala on the grounds that it was against the morality of Indian
women. 145
VII.THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA'S APPROACH TO DEALING
WITH KEY ISSUES
To analyze the Supreme Court of India's many approaches to the
issues raised in Section V from an economic perspective, we shall
rely on both: (1) various studies stemming from environmental
casesl46 that have dealt with the Indian experience of judicial
activism, 147 and (2) Indian case law.
A. Plaintiffs
Above, we noted that the Supreme Court has, in broad terms,
considerably relaxed the standing requirement in Public Interest
cases. Hence, the eligibility of a person to invoke the jurisdiction of
the courts is very much enlarged. Access to the courts has been
further eased by merely requiring that a prospective plaintiff write a
letter to institute court proceedings. 148 Rajamani observes that
public-minded individuals have utilized the courts for specific
environmental purposes.14 9  Such purposes have include the
protection of the Taj Mahal from corrosive air pollution, 5 0 the
reduced discharges into the Ganga River,' 5 ' and the reduction of air
145. See Lawyers' Panel to Watch Over Beauty Pagent, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 5,
2009, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Lawyers-panel-to-
watch-over-beauty-pageant/articleshow/4858327.cms.
146. See, e.g., RAZZAQUE, supra note 4; Rajamani, supra note 71; Armin
Rosencranz & Michael Jackson, The Delhi Case: The Supreme Court of India and
the Limits ofJudicial Power, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 223 (2003).
147. See SATHE, supra note 6; Sathe, supra note 11.
148. See DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 142; Sathe, supra note 11, at
74-75.
149. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 295.
150. Mehta (Taj Trapezium Matter) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No.
13381 of 1984.
151. Mehta (Calcutta Tanneries' Matter) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No.
3727 of 1985.
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pollution in Delhi and other metropolitan cities.152 Individuals who
wish to seek the Supreme Court in matters of the public interest to
address a particular environmental concern do not encounter any
difficulty as far as the formal locus standi requirements are
concerned. 153 Then, we must ask why the rational apathy problem
does not become a problem for specific citizens. The answer is that
these citizens are willing to invest a lot of time and money in
bringing cases in the public interest even though the results will
potentially and subsequently allow a large number of third parties to
free ride and benefit at the litigants' expense. Given the high number
of cases that have effectively been brought, usually by a small group
of individuals, one can argue that altruistic motives have provided
sufficient incentives to bring these cases in the public interest. 154 Of
course, personal interests, like the media attention that follows from
the cases, may be the motivation promoting some to bring these
actions.
Although it was not mentioned in these particular environmental
cases, there is growing concern that the claims could be vexatious or
frivolous155 given the increasing number of cases before the India
Supreme Court.156 It has been observed that an increasing number of
complaints are being lodged, claiming that litigants misused PL for
private reasons or simply to seek publicity.' 5 7 As a result, some have
questioned whether guidelines should be set to restrain and limit
PIL.' 58  These concerns, however, have been mostly been raised
regarding development projects which can be needlessly delayed
152. See, e.g., Mehta v. Union of India Writ Petition (C) No. 13029 of 1985.
153. DIVAN & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 139.
154. See generally, DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra, note 12 (M.C. Mehta has
acted as a plaintiff in over twenty cases).
155. However, in other cases courts have reacted against particular suits, arguing
that they were merely brought in the private interest of the plaintiff and, therefore,
not suited for PIL.
156. See Iyer, supra note 10, at 125 (reporting that at the end of October 2006
there were 38,675 cases awaiting hearing and disposal before the Supreme Court
and that it can take five years or more for a case to be heard); see also Cha, supra
note 12, at 210 (noting that the delay caused by the judicial backlog will be very
harmful to environmental litigation since time is of essence in many environmental
cases where continuous and irreversible environmental degradation is taking place).
157. IYER, supra note 10, at 150-52.
158. See Rajamani, supra note 71, at 321.
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through PIL. As far as environmental cases are concerned, the claim
has not made that personal interest would be at stake.
B. Defendants
Generally, citizens that use P1L usually proceed against the State,
asking that the State take a particular action where regulation has
either been unsuccessful or lacked enforcement.159 This is also true
for environmental PIL cases. In most cases, then, the State plays an
unusual defendant. Rather than disputing the allegations, the State
must also be the court's helpful fact-finder.160 In that sense, there is
no traditional adversarial proceeding in PIL.161
PL plaintiffs may then require the court to order the State to
undertake particular action which may have consequences for third
parties especially in environmental cases. These third parties are the
industries who are usually involved and will have to take action
subsequent to the court's order. Remarkably, the industries affected
by the court's order often do not appear as defendants in the case.
Consideration of the two following cases helps to illustrate this.162
In the first case, M.C. Mehta brought an action against Delhi air
pollution, citing the dramatic consequences for human health.163
After a long procedure and much consultation described below, the
court ordered the entire city bus fleet to substitute the use of petrol or
diesel for the alternative and cleaner fuel, compressed natural gas
("CNG").'64 Although some judicially-authorized consultation by
the Environment Pollution Prevention and Control Authority
("EPCA") had taken place, the agency did not consult the private bus
operators who were, obviously, affected by the case.165 Private bus
operators felt frustrated by their lack of access to the EPCA and to
the court.166 The private bus operators were more frustrated because
they did not formally participate in the proceedings before the
159. See Sathe, supra note 11, at 77-78.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Rajamani, supra note 71, at 298.
163. Id. at 298-99.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 299.
166. Id. at 305.
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court,167 and were only notified by the Delhi government fifteen
months after the court's order.168  When stakeholders, who are
regulated by a court's order, lack involvement in the court
proceedings, information gathering and enforcement problems may
result and impede efficient pollution reduction measures.
A similar problem arose in a municipal solid waste management
case where, as a result of a court order, the Ministry of the
Environment and Forestry ("MOEF") enacted municipal solid waste
management and handling rules ("MSW rules").169 Municipalities
across India were not involved in court proceedings and subsequently
failed to implement the orders and, subsequent, rules by the deadlines
set by the MSW rules.170
In both cases, however, the court found a way of involving at least
some of the stakeholders. The court has set up a committee
specifically created to obtain stakeholder involvement, where
possible.171 Nevertheless, some jurists remain critical of the fact that,
in many environmental cases, the court issues orders disadvantaging,
and potentially harming, parties who are not formally involved in the
proceedings.1 72 An example of this can be seen in cases where the
court has ordered the closure of polluting industries before the plant
owners of such industries were involved and heard before the
court.173
C. The Court
1. Information Advantage
i. Informational Needs in Cases ofExecutive Judicial Activism
One question we addressed above is how the Supreme Court of
India is able to become involved in environmental policy, given the
fact that traditionally administrative agencies are expected to have an
167. Id. at 299 (noting that private bus operators accounted for almost 80% of the
public transportation in Delhi).
168. Id. at 300.
169. Id. at 297.
170. Id. at 311.
171. Id. at 300-01.
172. IYER, supra note 10, at 148.
173. Id. (characterizing this as "clearly violative of the basics of natural justice").
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informational advantage. 174 If the court were to merely force the
government to execute legislated statutes, information problems
should not arise, because the environmental standards would have
already been set and the court would only be enforcing an existing
statute.' 7 5 To some extent, the environmental cases are directed
against the government to compel it to fulfill its enforcement duty or
to prevent any other illegal government activity. 17 6
Hence, in these instances, the Supreme Court made use of existing
environmental legislation and, through its actions, confirmed existing
legislation, which largely remained ineffective due to a lack of
enforcement.17 7 One such example is a 1988 case brought by M.C.
Mehta against tanneries for the pollution of the Ganga River.17 8 The
case was brought against tannery owners who were discharging
waste-water from their factories into the surface water of the Ganga
without first having been filtered by a water treatment plant, despite
having been requested to do so for many years. 179 In this case, the
court held that the Water Act, an existing statute, required the
polluters to maintain proper waste-water treatment facilities; thus,
174. See supra Section V.C. 1. In the particular case of India, one should be
careful with the assumption that the regulator has better information than the
judiciary:
This environmental amnesia of the legislature is due, in a large part, to the
absence of adequate scientific studies documenting the threats to health
and environment and the future challenges. Authentic studies on the
relationship between health and environment are few and far between and
the few that are commissioned are often not given due attention.
Knowledge on the current perceptions of threat to health from a polluted
environment remains appallingly poor. This ignorance has kept the
legislatures in a state of indifference to possible pollution hazards,
immensely endangering public health.
Dam, supra note 102, at 598-99.
175. See also Cha, supra note 12, at 205 (stating that the statutes and legislation
in India are well-defined and stringent, but the implementation and enforcement
have not been efficient).
176. See Sathe, supra note 11, at 80; see Cha, supra note 12, at 207 (noting that
there is criticism for the fact that the courts often do not look to the current
legislation for answers to environmental problems, but instead prefer to create their
own system of environmental protection).
177. Mehta (Calcutta Tanneries' Matter) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No.
3727 of 1985.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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supporting the correct execution of existing environmental legislation
in India. 80
However, problems with this approach arise where environmental
legislation is overtly broad or ambiguous, lacking specific
environmental standards.' 8 ' The judicial activism of the court is, in
those particular cases, specifically aimed at doing what the executive
should have done, that is, executing the law. 182 This is what Anant
and Singh refer to as executive judicial activism.183 Information
problems can clearly arise in these instances, since the legislator has
merely defined a broad framework, and it is up to the executive to set
specific standards using its informational expertise. Critics of the
judiciary fulfilling this function, point to court decisions that establish
unclear standards that fail to determine acceptable pollution levels.
As an example, these critics cite the Court's vague prohibition
against "severe pollution or resource degradation." 84 To the extent
that the courts provide very specific orders to the executive on how to
execute the environmental statutes, other questions arise as to where
the court obtains information from and what the optimal
environmental standards should be. Mijin Cha states that "it is rare
that courts rationally balance the struggle between environmental
protection and economic development. Moreover, the courts have not
180. See Cha, supra note 12, at 225-26.
181. See Dam, supra note 102, at 596-97 (stating that the source of
environmental law in India is often international law (which is often rather vague),
whereby declarations, treaties and conventions are negotiated for ratification, and
which lay down many principles that still wait statutory interpretation). See
generally DIVAN & ROSENCRANZ, supra note 12 (describing the development of
environmental law in India).
182. See DIVAN & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 12. The problem is, however, that
the Indian legislator often had a reactive approach to environmental problems and
many statutes lacked an effective implementation. See Dam, supra note 102, at
598-601.
183. Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4437.
184. See Anderson & Ahmed, supra note 118, at 337; Cha, supra note 12, at 207.
185. Scholars have been critical of the expertise of the courts to act in highly
specialised areas. For example, in a non-environmental related area, that of the
management of blood banks, the court gave detailed directions on how the banks
should collect the blood, store it and offer it for transfusion. There, the question
was asked whether the court had the necessary expertise over such a highly
specialized issue. Iyer, supra note 10, at 147-48.
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determined whether there is any acceptable amount of pollution, or
any level of risk that will not prove to be a violation."1 86
ii. An Example: The Delhi Vehicular Pollution Case
In the Delhi vehicular pollution case, Mr. Mehta initiated the case,
arguing that pre-existing environmental laws obligated the
government to take steps to reduce Delhi's air pollution in the interest
of public health. 187 However, the case clearly demonstrates that the
court was willing to go further than merely compelling government
action, which it was already forced to do by law.' 88 Since the court
also determined how the air quality in Delhi should be improved,
information problems concerning the court's expertise, or lack
thereof, can be raised. In the Delhi vehicular pollution case, the
question of how the government should order polluters to reduce air
pollution must be asked. There, the court went well beyond the mere
contents of a positive duty to act by examining, inter alia,
technologies worldwide, available technologies in India to order the
conversion of the entire bus fleet in Delhi to CNG.189 The vehicular
pollution case does not stand alone as a singular example of the
Supreme Court moving beyond mere execution of prior existing
legislation; other cases demonstrate similar behavior.190
Certain jurists are critical of the court engaging in this practice
because while they acknowledge that the court may be the arm of
progress in environmental protection, but their action result in further
alienating the court from the administration.191
iii. Legal Basis
The legal basis for the judicial activism by the Indian Supreme
Court can be found in the possibility of judicial review provided for
186. Cha, supra note 12, at 206.
187. See Rajamani, supra note 71, at 298.
188. Id.
189. Id., at 298-99.
190. See, e.g., Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 4677 of 1985.
191. See Cha, supra note 12, at 217-18 (stating that by publicly criticizing the
administration, the court reinforces the people's distrust towards the
administration).
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in Article 13 (1) of the Indian Constitution.' 92 Article 13 (2) further
provides that states shall not make any law that takes away or
abridges any of the fundamental rights and that laws made in
contravention shall be void.193 However, the cases discussed above
illustrate that the Supreme Court of India does not merely "review"
legislation, but goes much further by either legislating where the
legislator has been silent ("legislative judicial activism") or by
executing the law where the executive fails to do so ("executive
judicial activism").19 4 That raises, from an economic perspective, the
type of information problems we refer to here.
iv. Dealing with Information Problems
The court has a variety of ways to deal with the information
problem. For example, in the Municipal Solid Waste Management
case, the court set up a committee involving both the Ministry of
Urban Development ("MOUD") and the Ministry of Environment
and Forest ("MOEF"); the court can rely on the available expertise
within these ministries.' 95 Also in the Delhi vehicular pollution case,
the court directed MOEF to set up a committee chaired by Justice
Saskia to assess technologies worldwide and available technologies
in India in order to recommend "low cost alternatives for operating
vehicles and reduced pollution levels in the metropolitan cities of
India" 96 In both cases, the court relied on the input of stakeholders
by having them serve on the committees. For example, in the
vehicular pollution case, the committee contained high-ranking
bureaucrats, an NGO, and a representative of the automobile
industry. 197
To some extent, these committees inform the court of appropriate
measures to reduce pollution effectively, which the court issues as
orders.198 These orders often have a lasting influence.199 In some
192. See DIVAN & RoSENCRANZ, supra note 12, at 130-32 (providing examples
of the application of judicial review in environmental cases); see also RAZZAQUE,
supra note 4, at 186.
193. Sathe, supra note 11, at 38-39.
194. Cha, supra note 12, at 220 (stating that the Court goes much further and
oversteps the power given to it through the doctrine of judicial review).
195. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 297.
196. Id. at 298.
197. Id. at 303.
198. See Cha, supra note 12, at 207.
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cases, the Supreme Court follows a case on a long term basis and
adapts its orders to incorporate increasing information provided by
the committees.200 Hence, the information provided by the
committees and the adaptation of the decisions to this information
enables, at least in theory, a learning process where the quality of the
decision-making by the courts increases due to input by experts.201
2. Legitimacy
The strong involvement of the court over a long period of time
effectively leads to the judiciary replacing the executive as
environmental policy maker. This raises significant questions of the
legitimacy and accountability of the court to fulfil this role. Sathe
notes that the Indian Supreme Court not only makes law through
statutory interpretation, but also in the sense that it "actually
legislates." 202  The Court thereby "transcended the limits of the
judicial function and has undertaken functions which really belong to
either the legislator or the executive. Its decisions clearly violate the
limits imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers."203 This role
of the court is criticized for the simple reason that the court lacks the
institutional equipment for undertaking legislative or administrative
204functions, and is considered a problem because judges are not
205elected, and therefore, not accountable to any constituency. In
some cases, the court seems to ignore legislation and sets up its own
committee; for example, to report on the quality of the limestone
quarries.206 This is especially problematic in cases where the court
199. See, e.g., Mehta v. Union of India (Calcutta Tanneries' Matter), Writ
Petition (C) No. 3727 of 1985; Mehta v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 4677
of 1985.
200. An essential feature of the PIL is the court's post-litigation monitoring of its
orders. See Iyer, supra note 10, at 142.
201. Cha, supra note 12, at 221-22 (stating that the interventions of the court,
even though well meant, are often ineffective since the courts do not possess the
necessary expertise to deal with the issues at hand).
202. Sathe, supra note 11, at 88.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 89.
205. Id. at 105; see also Cha, supra note 12, at 210 (stating that by creating
legislation the court bypasses the democratic process and has no accountability to
the general public).
206. Cha, supra note 12, at 213.
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does not enforce India's existing environmental legislation, but
creates its own environmental rules. 207
This is also clear in the environmental cases where the court
establishes itself as the main protector of the environment and
undertakes tasks that go far beyond the judicial function.208 For
example, in the Delhi vehicular pollution case, the court not only
ordered the entire city bus fleet to convert to CNG but also
considered the issue of CNG pricing.209 Thus, in many cases where
formal legislation is lacking, the court has no problem with making
law; for example, by defining guidelines to prevent sexual
harassment in the work place. 210
The examples show that in practice the Supreme Court goes far
beyond the traditional competencies of a judiciary, violating the
separation of powers, which raises fundamental questions of
legitimacy and accountability.211
Even commentators, who realize the terrible state of the
environment in India and, accordingly, appreciate the courts' effort to
improve environmental quality, are quite critical of the role played by
the Court as a super-executive.212 Dam is especially critical of the
fact that the court introduced various principles, such as the polluter
pays-principle and the precautionary principle, via case law into
Indian environmental law even though these principles have had little
or no history in India. 213 He therefore, qualifies the judicial activism
in the environmental area as a "usurpation process." 21 4
Still, one has to make a distinction between whether the legislation-
like "judicial activism" violates the principle of the separation of
207. Id. at 214 (stating that the court is in this way also taking away the power of
the legislation from the legislature and granting it to the judiciary) (citing Mehta v.
Union of India, Writ Petition (C) No. 860 of 1991).
208. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 318 (citing Rosencranz & Jackson, supra note
131).
209. Id. at 313.
210. Id. at 316-17.
211. This issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed discussion of
the legitimacy ofjudicial activism, see SATHE, supra note 6, at 249-311.
212. See Dam, supra note 102, at 605 ("Irrespective of the success or failure of
such a course of action, the executive role of the court has been questioned, not
without valid reasons altogether.").
213. Id. at 608, 612.
214. Id. at 609-10.
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powers and whether the court has legitimacy in India. Given the fact
that most authors agree that the Supreme Court often takes the place
of the executive and even of the legislator, this judicial activism is
undoubtedly problematic from the perspective of the separation of
215powers. This raises questions about the accountability of the court
for the decisions it makes, since it cannot, like the legislator, be held
accountable through general elections for wrongful actions. It has to
be distinguished, however, from the degree of legitimacy the court
enjoys among the Indian public. In that respect, scholarship agrees
that, thanks to the rhetoric about the need to protect the poor and the
dispossessed, the Court undoubtedly was able to build up a strong
legitimacy among the Indian public.2 16 However, it is equally held
that the Supreme Court's legitimacy "is a legitimacy acquired largely
by default."217 That, of course, refers to the fact that the Supreme
Court has stepped in where the representative institutions have
largely failed. The issue of legitimacy is very subjective. Where one
author observes that the Supreme Court enjoys high legitimacy
among the Indian public,218 another states that the courts approach
towards PIL results in a loss of legitimacy. 2 19
3. Independence
We previously mentioned that it is easy to wonder how, in a
developing country, such as India, with capacity and corruption
problems in the executive branch,220 the judiciary has apparently
gained such a moral status that it can effectively act where politicians
215. See, e.g., Iyer, supra note 10, at 159.
216. Id. at 161-62.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also G.H. Gadbois, The Supreme Court of India as a Political
Institution, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWER: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE
V.R. KRISHNA IYER, 250, 258-59 (R. Dhavan, R. Sudarshan & S. Khurshid eds.,
1978).
219. See Cha, supra note 12, at 208 (stating that this is the case "due to what may
be perceived as a biased and extra-jurisdictional approach").
220. Corruption problems or (to put it mildly) the influence of private interests
over the executive and, more particularly, the Central Pollution Control Board, the
agency responsible for the implementation of environmental law in India, are well-
documented: the members of the board have no tenure and no financial
independence, see Dam, supra note 102, at 599, and "a corrupt liaison between the
board and the industrial lobby has made the pollution law an ideal cover for private
profit. Rather than punish, the laws protects polluters." Id. at 602.
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and administrators fail. The traditional answer in law and economic
scholarship is that this can only happen in an environment that
guarantees the court's independence, preventing judges from being
subject to the same corruption problems as politicians or
221bureaucrats. It would go beyond the scope of this article to
examine why it has apparently been possible to realize in India what
has traditionally been a major problem in other south-east Asian
developing countries, like Indonesia.222 However, the cases
previously mentioned show that the justices of the Supreme Court
have no difficulty of acting de facto independently by ordering the
223
government to take measures to reduce air pollution in Delhi, or to
reduce the discharge of polluting substances into the Ganga River.224
Sathe provides a few historical reasons why the judiciary in India has,
since the early years of the independence, developed itself as a
defender of the young democracy.225 Some guarantees suggested by
law and economic scholarship are incorporated into the Indian
model.226 In this respect we can point to the fact that a judge may
only be removed on the very specific grounds of misbehaviour or
incapacity, which are assessed by a quasi-judicial body.227
Politicians cannot remove a judge unless a charge of misbehaviour
would have been found valid by the committee. 228 Also, the
privileges or allowances, including the pension rights of the judge
cannot be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment. 229
In a recent study, Hayo and Voigt explain de facto judicial
independence. 230 They develop parameters for examining both de
221. See Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence
from the English Court ofAppeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831, 831-47 (1999).
222. See, e.g., POMPE, supra note 95.
223. See Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 63.
224. See Mehta (Calcutta Tanneries' Matter) v. Union of India, Writ Petition (C)
No. 3727 (1985).
225. Sathe, supra note 11, at 99-106.
226. Iyer, supra note 10, at 124.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining De Facto Judicial
Independence, 27 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 269, 269-90 (2007).
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juri and de facto independence.231 Not surprisingly, India scores
reasonably well in that empirical test. 232
Again, the independence and quality of the judiciary has to be
compared with the independence of executive agencies. In that
respect, the literature in India reports that the implementation by the
Pollution Control Boards can be qualified as one "tale of inefficient
implementation."233 Notwithstanding severe health effects, like the
consumption of arsenic contaminated water and the consumption of
vegetables containing large quantities of pesticides, regulatory bodies
always showed an aversion to challenge entrenched commercial
interests.234 It is not surprising that in this environment where the
Pollution Control Boards have no functional or financial
independence from commercial and political interests, better results
are obtained through an intervention by the independent judiciary.
4. The Court versus Executive
A question that we raised above asks how it is possible that the
Supreme Court is able to do what it is doing, and why politicians and
bureaucrats comply with the orders of the Court to such a large extent
in environmental matters. Some of this has to do with the moral
status of the Court resulting from its independence.235 Another
aspect is related to the instruments available to enforce its orders,
which we will elaborate on in Section VII.E, but there are other
reasons why politicians generally accept the Court's judicial
activism. Sathe states that none of the political players have strongly
protested against judicial intrusion into matters that essentially belong
to the executive.236 One reason may be that political players deem
the courts to be better arbiters than politicians in matters involving
237conflict between various competing interests. Thus, a traditional
public choice explanation could be provided for the success of the
Court: politicians may simply fear losing votes either when they
favor environmental interests too strongly over the interests of trade
231. Id. at 271.
232. Id. at 287.
233. Dam, supra note 102, at 601.
234. Id. at 601-05.
235. Sathe, supra note 11, at 89.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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unions and industry, or the reverse could occur if they favour
industrial interests too clearly.
Notwithstanding the fact that politicians do not generally criticize
judicial activism, it has become a subject of controversy in India and
some attempts have been undertaken to hinder the power of the
courts.238 However, none of these attempts has stopped judicial
activism resulting from PIL in the environmental field.23 One jurist
has argued that even though the court may be inspired by the urge to
protect public health, for example, against the carcinogenic effects of
suspended particles in the air, "implementation of such norms cannot
be achieved without the active and willing participation of the
executive."240
D. What the Supreme Court Orders
The specific environmental cases illustrate the orders of the
Supreme Court. The orders are usually directed against the
government or public authorities. 24 1  The Constitution gives the
Supreme Court and the high courts the power to use "directions,
orders or writs" for achieving the objectives of those articles. 24 2
Thus, the Court can issue specific orders to parties to act or refrain
from taking specific action.24 3 For example, in Mehta v. India the
Court asked the government of India to explain why a large part of
the toll tax and the visitor's fees received from tourists visiting the
Taj Mahal should go to the Agra Development Authority instead of
being spent on the preservation of the Taj Mahal and the cleaning of
the city of Agra.24 As in the Delhi Vehicular Pollution case, the
court ordered in July 1998 the entire city bus fleet to specifically
replace petrol and diesel with CNG by March 31, 2001. 245
238. Id. at 30.
239. Iyer, supra note 10, at 163 ("[E]ven the bitterest critic of the judiciary will
find it hard to deny is that neither the legislature nor the executive in India has ever
resorted to a tactic of sidelining the Supreme Court by ignoring its interventions.").
240. Dam, supra note 102, at 611.
241. See, e.g., Mehta v. Union of India, Petition (C) No. 3727 of 1985 (ordering
the government to enforce an order requiring tanneries to set up treatment plants);
see also supra Section VII.B.
242. INDIA CONST. art. 226.
243. Sathe, supra note 11, at 84.
244. Id. at 83.
245. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 299.
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In many cases, the court orders that are directed at public
authorities are very detailed and provide the authorities a clear
instruction on how to follow the order. 246  For example, in the
Kampur Tanneries case,247 the Court asked the central government to
direct all the educational institutions to teach lessons relating to the
protection and improvement of the natural environment for one hour
per week and instructed the central government to have textbooks
written for that purpose and to distribute them free of costs. 248 In the
Calcutta Tanneries case, the Court set a deadline for the closure of
the polluting tanneries, 249 ordered the state government to set-up a
unified single agency consisting of all departments concerned, and
directed the state government to appoint an authority to assess the
ecological loss. 2 50 These orders clearly show that the Court does not
hesitate to explain to the executive exactly how it should act, which
then casts doubt on the separation of powers.
E. Enforcement
A crucial question is how one can guarantee that there is
compliance with court orders. Article 141 of the Indian Constitution
provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be the law
of the land. 25 1 The high courts have held that this is not only the case
for the ratio decidendi, but even for the obiter dicta of the Supreme
Court; the orders of the Supreme Court are therefore also the law of
the land.252 That, of course, does not immediately answer the
question why defendants or third parties comply. The most important
reason is that in India, there is a strong fear of being held in contempt
by the court, a risk that the defendant and any others who are affected
by the court's order run.253 For example, in the Delhi Vehicular
Pollution case, the Delhi buses that could not comply with the court'
order to switch to an alternative fuel engine simply stayed off the
roads to avoid being held in contempt.254 Similarly, in the municipal
246. See, e.g., Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 103.
247. Id.
248. Dam, supra note 102, at 610.
249. Metha v. Union of India (1997) 2 S.C.C. 411.
250. Dam, supra note 102, at 610.
251. INDIA CONST. art. 141.
252. Sathe, supra note 11, at 86.
253. See Desai, supra note 9, at 37-39.
254. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 300.
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waste case, municipalities across India reacted with panic to the
threat of contempt proceedings and actively began implementing the
court's orders. 255
Of course, the court tries to facilitate compliance with its orders by,
for example, providing an implementation schedule. 256 Particularly,
in the municipal waste case, the Court ordered, compliance with the
new MSW rules on October 3, 2000, which required the development
of waste processing and disposal facilities by December 31 2003,
improvement of existing landfill sites by December 31 2001, and the
257identification of landfill sites for future use by December 31, 2002.
Notwithstanding these timelines and schedules, municipalities
underwent great difficulty to meet these court-imposed deadlines. 25 8
In the Delhi Vehicular Pollution case, the Court used the
instrument of the penalty payment to enforce its decision. The Court
ordered private diesel buses to pay fines of Rupees 500 per day in
case of non-conversion to CNG. 259
One important aspect of the environmental PL is that the Court,
itself, monitors the compliance of its orders.260 This involves the
appointment of magistrates or other judicial officers to conduct
periodic on-site visits whereby compliance is verified. 2 6 1 The results
are reported back either to the Supreme Court or to a designated high
court. 2 62 Thus, fear of formal penalties is likely not the only reason
that third parties comply with court orders. Given the general respect
for decisions of the Supreme Court, compliance with its orders seems
to be a social norm. 263
255. Id. at 311.
256. See Desai, supra note 9, at 36-37.
257. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 297.
258. Id. at 311-12; see also Cha, supra note 12, at 206 ("[R]ulings and
recommendations of the courts are in some cases 'as impossible to implement and
enforce as the current legislation."').
259. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 301.
260. lyer, supra note 10, at 142.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 438-40 (4th
ed. 2004) (describing the importance of social norms as inducing compliant
behaviour); ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBOURS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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VIII.ANALYSIS
A. Efficiency versus Effectiveness
1. Efficiency
Even if evidence proves that P11 in India reduces pollution levels,
this does not mean that pollution levels would necessarily be reduced
to efficient levels. Indeed, we did not make any analysis of what
efficient pollution levels in India would be, and whether the PIL is
the ideal instrument to reach that goal. In practice, it is probably
impossible to test the efficiency of PIL, and specifically whether PIL
is the legal instrument that optimally contributes to maximizing
social welfare. There are, however, a number of papers by
economists that have addressed the theoretical effect of PIL on social
welfare. Anant and Singh do not make a specific welfare analysis,
but suggest that judicial activism, which is broader than the P1L we
address in our article, can have some virtues but may also lead to
raising social costs. 264 In another paper, Mishra and Anant show that
judicial activism can, under some circumstances, be welfare
improving, whereas excessive activism may reduce welfare.265
However, that paper merely models judicial activism under various
266circumstances. Papers that actually examine whether PIL of the
type developed by the Supreme Court of India increases or decreases
social welfare have, to our understanding and research, not been
undertaken yet. This may have to do with methodological problems
in testing it empirically.
At best, one can test whether PIL has actually reduced pollution
levels. Even if one were to find such environmental effectiveness,267
this is conclusive from an economic perspective unless the price to
reach a reduction of environmental pollution is the lowest compared
to alternative solutions. Hence, in addition to addressing the
environmental effectiveness of PIL, one should also consider its cost-
effectiveness by addressing whether in this particular case the goal of
264. Anant & Singh, supra note 2, at 4438-39.
265. Ajit Mishra & T.C.A. Anant, Activism, Separation of Powers and
Development, 81 J. DEV. ECON. 457, 457-77 (2006).
266. Id.
267. See Section VIII.A.2.
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reducing pollution levels set by the court or legislator has been
attained at the lowest possible costs. 2 68
2. Environmental Effectiveness
Whether PIL and actions of the Indian Supreme Court have
effectively reduced pollution levels in the cases where the court
intervened must be determined. The evidence is not overwhelming.
On the one hand, the possibility that a court will intervene in a
pollution case is inherently limited by the fact that the court can only
act when a relevant case is brought and does not have the same
ability a legislator or administrative authority has to regulate
pollution levels more generally. 26 9 Sathe notes that the court "cannot
stop entirely the degradation of the environment or government
lawlessness. Its actions in these areas are bound to be symbolic." 270
Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that the Indian Supreme
Court's orders have led to a substantial reduction of pollution
levels. 27 1 Raja and Xavier argued that the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the Dehli vehicular pollution case have led to substantial
improvements of the air quality in Delhi.272 Also, Rajamani states
that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the municipal solid waste
management and Delhi vehicular pollution cases have led to visible
improvements in solid waste management in cities and air quality in
Delhi.273 The same is argued by Dam; after first having described in
detail the terrible state of the environment in India and the total
inability of the legislator and executive to provide an adequate
response, Dam qualifies the environmental case law of the Supreme
Court as "a judicial cleaning-up of the environment." 2 74
Nevertheless, the actions of the Supreme Court in this respect do
not go undisputed. Above, we mentioned that a lack of involvement
of stakeholders, especially the defendants, led not only to frustration,
but also to delays in the implementation of the court's decisions.275
268. See Section VIII.A.3.
269. Sathe, supra note 11, at 89.
270. Id.
271. Raja, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3, at 16-18.
272. See sources cited supra note 3.
273. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 319.
274. Dam, supra note 102, at 605.
275. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 299-300.
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Rajamani contends that the Court's decision to force Delhi bus
companies to convert to CNG initially led to chaotic situations where
buses had to travel forty kilometres and spend several hours queuing
up outside CNG dispensing stations, since too few were available,
leading to fewer buses being available.276 The central government
also pleaded that there was a resulting shortage of CNG, which made
it impossible to convert all vehicles within the time limits set by the
court.277
Furthermore, the general propriety of courts' legislating efforts has
been questioned. 278 The main concern being the overall development
of healthy governmental practices; the fear is that the case law may
invade the traditional domain of the other governmental branches,
which may retard the evolution of a responsible bureaucracy.279
3. Cost Effectiveness
From an economic perspective, it is especially important to know
whether PIL is cost-effective, in the sense that the environmental
results are reached at the lowest costs possible. This question has
two separate parts: (1) whether the measures imposed as a result of
the Supreme Court ruling were cost-effective so that the contents of
the environmental measures ordered by the court gave incentives to
operators to reach the reduction of pollution levels at lowest cost
possible; and (2) whether P1L is the lowest cost alternative to reach
this particular goal.
i. Cost Effectiveness of Public Interest Litigation
Regarding PIL's affordability, information on the precise costs of
PIL is not known. One could argue that these costs could be
substantial, given that the Supreme Court has in some cases ordered
several rulings, involved many committees, and, in one instance, had
to follow-up on a case for many years. 280 The administrative costs
276. Id. at 308. This constituted an equity problem since it was particularly the
people relying on public transit who initially suffered from the decision.
277. Dam, supra note 102, at 611.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 611-12 (citing Murli Deora v. Union of India (2001) 8 S.C.C. 766)
(highlighting the prohibition against smoking in public places, which the author
doubts would have resulted through a judicial decision).
280. Raja & Xavier, Economic Efficiency, supra note 3, at 20.
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required for a functioning judiciary, thus, can be substantial. In
contrast, the essence of private interest litigation is that a plaintiff can
start the proceedings at a relatively low cost, and that the
administrative costs of PIL should not necessarily be larger than the
costs of running a functioning regulatory system. 28 1 In regulation, an
administrative agency needs to intervene to set regulatory standards
for the entire industry, and it needs to install monitoring, enforcement
and compliance systems. Hence, even without precise cost-benefit
data, one can intuitively argue that the administrative costs of PIL
should not necessarily be higher than the costs of reaching the same
goals via the regulatory system.
There remains, however, a question as to whether PIL is filed by
the same type of petitioners, what some would characterize as a
"clique." 282 The danger of having the same plaintiffs is that the court
may hear only one particular type of argument, which could bear on,
potentially negatively, the quality of the decision-making.283
ii. Cost Effectiveness of the Measures Imported
Rajamani notes that in the Delhi vehicular pollution case, the court
imposed an extremely high cost option without examining whether
lower cost alternatives were available.284 She argues that even
though CNG is an environmentally friendly fuel, it is also extremely
costly and emits more greenhouse gases than a comparable diesel
285
vehicle. Notwithstanding the introduction of the CNG program,
there still was a 21.3% increase in lung diseases in Delhi and a more
than a 20% increase in asthma attacks;286 thus, casting further doubt
on the cost-effectiveness of the measure ordered by the court.
Rajamani formulates a similar criticism with respect to the Court's
ruling in the municipal solid waste management case.287 She argues
that the rules do not contain incentives either to promote recycling or
to minimize waste since the rules basically permit the processing of
waste through incineration, leading potentially to large emissions of
281. Sathe, supra note 11, at 72-73.
282. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 305.
283. Id. at 305-06.
284. Id. at 308.
285. Id. at 312-13.
286. Id. at 312.
287. See id. at 309-14.
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dioxins.288 Moreover, Rajamani criticises the Court for imposing a
relatively high-cost environmental solution, which may not
correspond with the preferences of the citizenry, but rather to the
preferences of the middle-class judiciary of which the Supreme Court
in India consists.289 A similar concern is raised by Iyer, who argues
that PIL "has become a means for the advancement of middle-class
concerns rather than an instrument for the liberation of the poor and
the oppressed, as it was originally conceived." 290
B. Indicators for an Effective Public Interest Litigation
1. The Case of India
Having analyzed the cost-effectiveness of some of the
environmental cases in which measures were ordered by the Supreme
Court of India as a result of PIL, we have arrived at the following
conclusions. Thanks to the Court's PIL rulings, pollution levels in
India have decreased, which probably would not have been realized
through the existing legislative and regulatory system.291 In that
sense, some of these rulings must have been effective. On the other
hand, the contents of the rulings may not always have been "optimal"
in the economic sense, since the alternative imposed by the Court
may not always have been the lowest cost option to achieve the stated
goal.
Rajamani presents another nuanced conclusion. She argues that "in
a system in which policy-makers and law-enforcers are perceived as
apathetic, if not corrupt, and politicians are perceived as opportunistic
demagogues rather than as visionary leaders" the Supreme Court of
India has performed extremely well, as far as providing
environmental protection is concerned.292 This judicial activism is,
288. Id. at 309-10.
289. Id. at 303.
290. lyer, supra note 10, at 160.
291. Environmental PIL in India should always be examined against the
background of the devastating environmental quality in India, the "environmental
amnesia of the legislature," and the capture of the executive and Central Pollution
Control Board by private interest. Dam, supra note 102, at 598-602.
292. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 293.
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therefore, qualified as a "chemotherapy for the carcinogenic body
politic."293
Given the many problems encountered at the regulatory level, the
Supreme Court of India has, consequently and clearly, filled a gap
where regulation failed. This seems to correspond with traditional
environmental economic literature on the choice of instruments, since
private law solutions are advanced where regulatory solutions have
been unsuccessful. 294
However, besides not being cost-effective, other criticisms are
levied against environmental PIL, particularly where the judiciary
tries to substitute judicial governance for executive governance, PIL
is not the optimal approach to reaching sustainable environmental
solutions. Here, the judicial decisions are reactive, 295 rather than
proactive, possibly resulting in the underdevelopment of a
responsible and independent bureaucracy.296 Dam stresses this point
by arguing that "it is unlikely that any of these decisions have
sensitised the executive to act with greater alacrity in environmental
matters. The only effect may have been to retard the possible
evolution of responsible bureaucracy." 297 Dam continues, "the cases
have become a crutch, preventing the growth of strong bureaucracy.
despite more than a decade of judicial activism there is no indication
of a better performance by the Pollution Control Boards,"298 and
concludes "the future may not be as green as the court may wish
for."299
Given the inability of the judiciary to provide a long-term judicial
oversight and given its inability to act proactively, the judiciary's
tendency to position itself as the main protector of the environment
293. Id. at 295; see also Desai, supra note 9, at 40 ("The judiciary has to deal
with these issues due to failure on the part of administration.").
294. See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 31, 422-53 (discussing the mix
of instruments).
295. Dam, supra note 102, at 598. Again this may generally be true, but in the
particular case of India it is reported that "the legislature's approach to pollution
laws has been principally reactive." Id.
296. Rajamani, supra note 71, at 315; see also Cha, supra note 12, at 215 (stating
that by bypassing procedural standards and regulations, the court is contributing to
the inefficiency of governmental action).
297. Dam, supra note 102, at 611.
298. Id. at 612.
299. Id.
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can be counterproductive in the long run because no sustainable
solution is achieved.300
While, as a result of judicial activism of the Indian Supreme Court,
environmental quality may have slightly improved, general
environmental conditions in India are still dramatic and often
hazardous. India is likely to have forty-two million asthma patients
by 2010 and serious threats to public health still occur as a result of
pollution and hazardous waste. 30 1 This demonstrates that alone
judicial activism is not enough; other legislative, regulatory and
enforcement mechanisms are required to achieve sustainable
environmental solutions.
2. In General
Lessons can be drawn from these environmental PIL cases, and
these lessons can play a positive role in shaping future environmental
policy, especially in developing countries like India. Previous
writings have indicated that at certain branches and tiers of
government, whether it be at the federal, state or local level,
regulatory efforts can be ineffective because of capacity or corruption
problems. Thus, it is important to choose the appropriate instrument
and level of government to avoid those issues and successfully
implement regulatory policy. 302 The result is that when capacity and
corruption problems are considered, a secondary solution, which
deviates from traditional law and economics solutions, may be
chosen. The relative success of PIL in India fits into this strand of
literature. Whereas the use of administrative or legislative regulation
represents an ideal solution for environmental problems, 303 it may not
be politically feasible where serious capacity or corruption problems
exist. In those situations, it may be better to consider secondary
solutions, if other levels of government or instruments are less
vulnerable for the mentioned problems.
India's experiences show that where the legislative and
administrative bodies are unable to implement an effective
environmental policy, the judiciary, and more particularly the
Supreme Court, has stepped in to provide this secondary solution. To
300. See Rosencranz & Jackson, supra note 147, at 249.
301. Dam, supra note 102 at 594-95.
302. See Ogus, supra note 300; Ogus, supra note 26; Schdifer, supra note 23.
303. See Shavell, supra note 22, at 368-70.
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a large extent, this complies with the suggestions made in the
literature discussed.
However, it is equally clear that this second-best approach will
likely only work for in the short term, with the long term objective
being regulatory solutions. Indeed, given the reactive rather than
proactive nature of court decisions and given the informational
advantage regulators possess, court interventions may be effective
only to the extent they act as a remedy to executive apathy. In the
long run, the executive should step in to provide more sustainable
solutions. Moreover, the India example shows that the judiciary may
lack the necessary expertise and information to conduct a proper cost-
benefit analysis, which is required to set cost-effective environmental
standards. This is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court of
India often does not engage in formal standard setting, but rather
broadly prohibits "serious pollution."304 To the extent that the
judiciary's standards are ineffective, the executive may still have to
step in and execute more precise standards. If all PL achieves is
stimulating the executive to take action where it previously abrogated
responsibility, it still plays a significant and positive role in
promoting sound environmental policy.
3. Lessons
Combining the experiences of the Indian cases with the framework
provided in the law and economics literature discussed above, a
number of lessons can be drawn out that point to the circumstances
where environmental PL may be effective. The following
summarizes those circumstances in addition to outlining situations
where PIL's effectiveness can be increased.
First, given the presumed informational advantage of regulatory
and administrative authorities to set environmental standards in a
cost-effective way, environmental standard setting through the
judiciary should only take place as a secondary option; that is, when
capacity or corruption problems threaten to render a regulation or
standard unenforceable.
Second, the example of the Indian Supreme Court demonstrates
that when judicial standard setting takes place, protections should be
introduced to ensure that the judiciary has the necessary information
304. See Cha, supra note 12, at 216-2 1.
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to established cost-effective standards. One way to do this is to make
use of advisory committees. However, one should be careful that the
judiciary does not intervene in the functioning of the market, e.g., by
fixing prices for specific commodities, like CNG.
Third, in order to obtain a guarantee of cost-effective standard
setting and a guarantee of effective compliance and enforcement,
high stakeholder involvement in the court's decision making is
encouraged, either by having stakeholders involved in the committees
or by allowing them to provide information, for example, as amicus
curiae, on various alternative environmental options.
Fourth, reliance on the court and judicial activism via PIL only
makes sense in cases where it is clear that the problems that occur at
the level of the legislator or executive do not occur in the same way
with the judiciary. 305  Hence, when PIL is used as a method for
environmental standard setting, judicial independence should
guarantee that better results are achieved.
Fifth, given the fact that a court only acts pursuant to the case
raised before it, PIL-based standard setting can only be a temporary
solution where the legislative and executive systems have failed.
Ideally, judicial activism should trigger the regulatory and
administrative authorities into action. Indeed, in the long run,
sustainable environmental solutions are best achieved through
regulatory standard setting.306
IX CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in India is known worldwide for its judicial
activism, especially in the environmental arena.307  A plaintiff
litigator, like Mr. Mehta, is now considered an environmental hero
and many consider PIL as an excellent tool to further environmental
305. In many developing countries, serious corruption or capacity problems arise
with the judiciary as well. Hence, one can predict that in those legal systems PIL
may not have the same success as in India. Above, we provided the example of
Indonesia where serious problems with the judiciary exist and, not surprisingly,
environmental PIL has not developed in the same manner as in India.
306. Cf id. at 222 (stating that progress in environmental protection in India can
only be achieved when the court tries to work with and not against the current
legislative regime).
307. See, e.g., Iyer, supra note 10, at 141 (quoting C.E. Cunningham's
qualification of the Indian Supreme Court as "the world's most powerful court").
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